Eagar Inc v. James Leroy Eagar : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1999
Eagar Inc v. James Leroy Eagar : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wesley C. Argyle, David O. Black; Black, Smith, Argyle; attorneys for appellees.
Paul M. Durham, Steve K. Gordon; Durham, Jones, Pinegar; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Eagar Inc v. James Leroy Eagar, No. 990539 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2223
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EAGAR, INC. and L. STANLEY BELL 
Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellees, 
v. 
JAMES LERO Y EAGAR, 
Defendant, Counterclaimant and 
Appellant. 
Court of Appeals No. 990539-CA 
Argument Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES EAGAR, INC. AND L. STANLEY BELL 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RODNEY F. PAGE 
Wesley C.Argyle (0123) 
David O. Black (0346) 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
96 West 200 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801)294-4172 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellees Eagar, Inc. and 
L. Stanley Bell 
FILED 
Utah Court of ApptlC 
MAY q 0 2000 
Julia D'Aleeandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2424 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Counterclaimant and Appellant 
James LeRoy Eagar 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EAGAR, INC. and L. STANLEY BELL 
Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellees, 
v. 
JAMES LEROY EAGAR, 
Defendant, Counterclaimant and 
Appellant. 
Court of Appeals No. 990539-CA 
Argument Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES EAGAR, INC. AND L. STANLEY BELL 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RODNEY F. PAGE 
Wesley C.Argyle (0123) 
David O. Black (0346) 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
96 West 200 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801)294-4172 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellees Eagar, Inc. and 
L. Stanley Bell 
Paul M. Durham (0939) 
Steve K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2424 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Counterclaimant and Appellant 
James LeRoy Eagar 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
2 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
2 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
3 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
4 
ARGUMENT 
5 
A. THE APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED ALL RELEVANT FACTS 
AS ALLEGED BY APPELLEES, LEAVING ONLY THE LEGAL 
ISSUE AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT, 
WHICHENTLTLESAPPELLEESTODECLARATORYJUDGMENT. 
-i-
B. APPELLEE BELL HAS NOT ADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ANY LEASE. 9 
C. APPELLEE BELL HAS NOT ADMITTED THA T THE PARTIES 
HA VE NEVER AGREED WALL OF THE MATERIAL TERMS 
OF A COMMERCIAL LEASE. 
9 
D. THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES REGARDING LEASE PAYMENT 
10 
E. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT. APPELLEES ARE 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND BY THE 
DEFINITION OF THIS RELIEF APPELLANTS ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
14 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773 (Utah 1957) 1, 7, 11 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991) 7, 11 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) 1, 8, 12 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 4-501 2 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 2 
-m-
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by James LeRoy Eagar ( "Eagar") from the May 12, 1999 final 
judgment of the Honorable Rodney F. Page of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis 
County, State of Utah in favor of appellees (collectively "Bell"). Pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2-2(4) (1996), this appeal was assigned to this court which has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the parties' agreement with respect to the 
lease was unambiguous? If the agreement is unambiguous the court may exclude extrinsic 
evidence. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773 (Utah 1957). This issue 
was raised at trial court. R. 61, 341-342, 590 at 28. 
2. If there were ambiguities in the contract, was the appellant the draftsman of 
the contract? Ambiguities in contracts are to be construed against the draftsman. Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). This issue was raised at trial court. R. 341-342. 
3. Did the trial court err in denying the motion for summary judgment of 
appellant? If there were no disputed material issues of fact in favor of appellant, or if there 
were disputed material issues of fact, then such motion should have been denied. This issue 
was raised in the trial court. R. 403-406. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code Jud. Admin R. 4-501 are determinative. See 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves the purchase by appellee of appellant's business. Appellant was 
in the aquaculture business, selling equipment and supplies to fish hatcheries. 
Appellant had founded this business and worked in if for a number of years, but had 
decided to sell his business. This led to the offer to purchase the business by appellee. 
Appellee offered to purchase the business at a specified price which included obtaining lease 
of premises used by the business, which were also owned by appellant, for $2,281.00 per 
month (the amount paid by the corporation at the time of the sale) for a term often years. 
The parties ultimately agreed on the sales price and terms for the business, including a five 
year lease of premises at the rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to annual adjustments 
based upon the consumer price index after the second year and a five year option to extend 
the lease upon the same terms, subject to adjustment to reflect changes in the consumer price 
index.. Appellant failed to produce the lease as required by the agreement and appellee filed 
suit to enforce the provisions of said lease. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
The trial court granted appellee's motion for partial summary judgment and denied 
appellant's motion for summaryjudgment on May 12, 1999. R. 539-541; R. 590 at 28-30. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee purchased the business in January of 1997. He learned of the business 
through a broker with the Business Resource Center, a business brokerage company, in the 
fall of 1996. Since he was interested in purchasing the business, he made an offer to 
purchase the business. The terms of the offer included the terms, purchase price and payment 
for the assets of the business, and a requirement that the building, which was also owned by 
appellant, be leased to appellee upon the same terms and conditions as it had been leased to 
the company at the time of the sale for a period often (10) years from the date of sale. R. 
64. 
In response to his offer, appellee received a counter offer modifying the terms of 
purchase, and specifying that a five year lease at current rate subject to adjustment pursuant 
to the consumer price index annually after the second year, together with an option to extend 
the lease upon the same terms for an additional five year term. Appellee accepted appellant's 
counteroffer. R. 67-68. 
Appellee and appellant subsequently executed a Release of Contingencies, again 
stating the terms of the lease as outlined herein, and entered into a purchase agreement for 
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the business. R. 71. Appellees agreed that appellant would subsequently present a lease 
embodying these terms agreed upon to appellees. Although several draft leases were 
presented none of them embodied the terms agreed upon in the Counteroffer. R. 73-76,252-
299. 
The trial court found that the Counteroffer and Contingency Removal were 
unambiguous and that appellees were entitled to declaratory judgment establishing the 
existence of the lease and requiring that appellant provide a written lease to appellees. R. 
590 at 27. The trial court further denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. R. 590 
at 27-30. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties agreed to the terms of a triple net lease for a term of five years at the 
specified rate of $2,281.00 per month, subject to adjustment reflecting changes in the 
consumer price index after the second year and subsequently. They agreed that these were 
the material terms of this lease, and that the lease was to be drafted by appellant and 
delivered to appellees. This agreement was set forth with clarity in the Counteroffer and the 
Contingency Removal. 
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ARGUMENT 
A, THE APPELLANT HAS ADMITTED ALL RELEVANT PACTS 
AS ALLEGED BY APPELLEES, LEA VING ONLY THE LEGAL 
ISSUE AS TO THE INTERPRETATIONOFTHE CONTRACT 
WHICH ENTITLES APPELLEES TO DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
Appellant has admitted the execution of each and every document relevant to this 
matter. Both the Counteroffer and the Contingency Removal are clear and unambiguous 
documents, outlining the terms of the lease. 
The terms of the lease were set forth with clarity in both the Counteroffer (R. 67-68) 
prepared by appellant and in the Contingency Removal (R. 71). These terms were: 
1. The lease was to be for five (5) years. 
2. The lease was to be triple net. 
3. The lease rate was to be $2,281.00 for the first two years, plus the 
expenses involved in the triple net. 
4. The balance of the five year term was to be at a base rent adjusted 
pursuant to changes in the consumer price index. 
5. There was to be one five-year option upon the terms existing at the time 
of the exercise of the option, adjusted to reflect changes in the 
consumer price index. 
The Contingency Removal guaranteed that the lease would be valid and would be 
produced by appellant. Despite the passage of nearly two years, appellant failed to produce 
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the lease in question, and further continued to refuse to produce the lease required until 
ordered to do so by the District Court. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, together with their interpretative case law are 
abundantly clear: when there are no material issues of fact to be determined, the Court may 
interpret the law. Under the facts presented, the Court entered a summary judgement 
declaring the existence of a lease between appellees and appellant upon the terms set forth 
herein. 
The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood by the District Court, 
appellant's attempt to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. Appellee Bell 
made an offer to purchase the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase was 
that a lease be given on the building at the agreed upon rate for the agreed upon term. The 
parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided by 
appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous drafts 
have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon by 
the parties until after the order of the District Court. 
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed 
upon, but for a much shorter term. R. 73-76. Since that initial document, the terms have 
drawn further and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was 
agreed upon by the parties. 
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous: 
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Lease 5 year Triple Net 
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net. 
Balance 3 years tie to CPI 
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67) 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which makes this 
matter clearly a fit subject of a motion for summary judgment: 
The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine 
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is 
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. By bee, 306 
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated: 
[Ijntent should be ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument 
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic 
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a 
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be 
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the 
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written 
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is 
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rales of 
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations 
omitted). 
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the 
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by 
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market 
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to 
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda 
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executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue 
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for 
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in 
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there 
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell. 
Indeed, appellant is trapped by his own arguments under Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for 
the drafting of a document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the 
document, the document is to be construed against the party who drafted the document. 
"The well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a 
contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). 
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer. 
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. The District Court found that the terms of 
the counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. Under the best analysis offered by appellant, 
and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are, indeed, two equally 
plausible interpretations of the written contract (which is not the case) the two interpretations 
offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and appellee must 
prevail. 
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B. APPELLEE BELL HAS NOT ADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ANY LEASE. 
Appellee Bell has not admitted that the parties have never agreed to any lease. The 
language quoted from his deposition is quoted out of context and the meaning placed upon 
by the appellant was not that clearly indicated in the deposition. The question was posed 
after a long a meticulous review of draft after draft of proposed leases which did not embody 
the basic terms agreed upon by the parties. To complete the quote: "Hence our being here." 
It was appellee Bell's intent to say that the appellant had never tendered a lease embodying 
the terms in question to him, thus the matter required resort to the Court. See: Second 
Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398. To the contrary, Appellee Bell's statement was 
an affirmation of his position that although the parties had completed their agreement, that 
the formal agreement had not been produced by Appellant as required by the agreement. 
C. APPELLEE BELL HAS NOT ADMITTED THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE NEVER AGREED TO ALL OF THE MATERIAL TERMS 
OF A COMMERCIAL LEASE. 
Appellee Bell has admitted that there are more teims to a lease than those set forth in 
the agreement of the parties. This is obvious. Appellee Bell asserts that the only terms that 
were material to him in the lease were those set forth in the counteroffer, and that in fact, if 
the terms of the counteroffer were included in the agreement, he would have accepted every 
lease proposed by appellant. See: Second Affidavit of L. Stanley Bell. R. 397-398. 
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D. THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES REGARDING LEASE PAYMENT 
The facts of this case are eminently clear and easily understood, appellant's attempt 
to obfuscate and confuse the issues not withstanding. The facts are that appellee Bell made 
an offer to purchase the assets of the corporation from the appellant. A term of the purchase 
was that a lease be given on the building at an agreed upon rate for an agreed upon term. 
The parties agreed that all of the other terms were mere technicalities and would be provided 
by appellant in a document to be drafted after closing. Two years passed and numerous 
drafts have been presented, but none of them have embodied those simple terms agreed upon 
by the parties until after the order of the District Court. 
The appellant initially offered a lease providing terms very similar to those agreed 
upon, but for a much shorter term. Since that initial document, the terms have drawn further 
and further away from the agreement. The appellees ask for only what was agreed upon by 
the parties. 
The language which the parties agreed upon is clear and unambiguous: 
Lease 5 year Triple Net 
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net. 
Balance 3 years tie to CPI 
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, its construction by the Court can be done as a matter of law, which allows the 
Court to deny appellant's Motion out of hand without even reaching the supposed issues: 
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The interpretation of a contract is a matter of law for the court to determine 
unless the contract is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is 
a matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the contract. Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
The court more fully examined this issue in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. By bee, 306 
P.2d 773 (Utah 1957), in which it stated: 
[Ijntent should be ascertained first from the four corners of the instrument 
itself, second from other contemporaneous writings, and third from extrinsic 
parol evidence of the intentions. If ambiguity can be reconciled from a 
reasonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence should not be 
allowed. If the instrument on its face remains ambiguous in spite of the 
reasonable construction, the intent may be ascertained in the light of all written 
instruments which were a part of the same transaction. If the intent is 
ambiguous still, then parol evidence may be admitted, and rules of 
construction may be invoked to declare the intention of the parties. (Citations 
omitted). 
Appellant has argued that the language in question is ambiguous, and that the 
document lends itself to two equally possible interpretations, first, the one offered by 
appellees, and second the one that allows for the adjustment of the rent to the "fair market 
value." Appellant's argument requires that the Court read a good deal into the contract to 
reach its conclusion. Nowhere in any of the various documents, agreements and memoranda 
executed by the parties do the words "fair market value" appear. The only place this issue 
was ever discussed was between appellant and his broker. R. 214, 220-221. Assuming, for 
the purposes of this argument that the statements by appellant and his broker as offered in 
the Affidavits are true, and that appellant and his broker actually discussed these issues, there 
is no factual allegation that the information was actually communicated to appellee Bell. 
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Appellant once again cannot prevail under Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled on this issue with great clarity. Where a party is responsible for the drafting of a 
document and there is more than one possible interpretation of the document, the document 
is to be construed against the party who drafted the document. "The well-established rule 
in Utah is that any uncertainly with respect to construction of a contract should be resolved 
against the party who had drawn the agreement," Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 Utah 
(1982). 
The uncontroverted facts are clear. Appellant and his agent drafted the counteroffer. 
The counteroffer was accepted by appellee Bell. Appellees believe that the terms of the 
counteroffer are clear and unambiguous. The District Court agreed. Under the best analysis 
offered by appellant, and granting all of appellant's facts, the answer is the same: If there are, 
indeed, two equally plausible interpretations of the written contract (which appellants 
strongly dispute, since the so called plausible explanation requires reading something into 
the agreement that even appellant does not allege was discussed between the parties) the two 
interpretations offered must be construed against the draftsman of the counteroffer, and 
appellees must prevail. 
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E. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT. APPELLEES ARE 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND BY THE 
DEFINITION OF THIS RELIEF APPELLANTS ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
By arguing for summary judgment on his own behalf, appellant concedes that there 
are no factual issues. The facts are fully before the Court as set forth in the Counteroffer: 
Lease 5 year Triple Net 
Fix Rate first 24 month $2,281.00 + 3 Net. 
Balance 3 years tie to CPI 
Plus 1 5 year option (R. 67) 
The holding of the District provides the best legal analysis against the appellant's flawed 
argument for summary judgment: 
The Court would find that in looking at the counter offer of the 
contingency removal and then the closing that occurred on this 
particular sale, it is clear to the Court that the terms of the 
payment are unambiguous. It said specifically in the counter 
offer made by Mr. Eagar and dated by him, under that term it 
was a five year triple net lease, fixed rate for the first 24 months 
at $2,281. The balance of the three years would be tied to the 
CPI and then there was a on five year option. That's not 
ambiguous in any way. 
It becomes even less subject to ambiguity when you look at the 
contingency removal which, again, was signed by Mr. Eagar, 
and, again, provided that they would enter into a lease 
agreement with a base rate of $2,281 per month for the first 24 
months plus three years additional with an adjusted base tied to 
the CPI plus one five year option to reinstate. Also- or to 
renew. Also tied to the Consumer Price Index. This lease shall 
be triple net and the lease would be drawn outside of closing. 
The Court would find that these terms are unambiguous. Triple 
net is a term of art, widely accepted within the industry and 
business world; that the Consumer Price Index is also well 
known and accepted and used in many facets of our business 
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life and other governmental capacities to make computations 
and adjustments based upon that Consumer Price Index. 
Therefore, the Court will grant partial summary judgment and 
find that the agreement entered into by the parties was that they 
would enter into a lease agreement; that the terms of payment 
would $2,281 per month for the first 24 months. The balance of 
the three years would be adjusted pursuant to the Consumer 
Price Index and there is no ambiguity as to what was meant by 
adjusted based because the sentence before in the Contingency 
Removal refers to the base rate at $2,281 per month. So, there 
is no question. We're talking about the same thing. That the 
lease would be triple net which under the common parlance and 
understanding in the industry means property taxes, utilities, 
maintenance and insurance. The Court would find that it 
provides again for a renewable option for an additional five 
years, again tied to the Consumer Price Index. So the court 
grants summary partially on that particular issue. R. 590 at 28-
30. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellees respectfully request that this Court: (1) sustain 
the decision of the trial court granting appellee's motion for partial summary judgment; and 
(2) sustaining the decision of the trial court in denying appellant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
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Dated trustify day of May, 2000. 
BLACK, STITH & ARGYLE, P.C. 
'esleyT/r Argyle 
David O. Black 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Counterclaim 
Defendants and Appellees Eagar, Inc. and 
L. Stanley Bell 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^fyh day of May, 2000,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Paul M. Durham 
Steve K. Gordon 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
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